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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

GENERAL EMPHASIZES IMPORTANCE OF CRITICISM

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 21 Mar 82 p 2

[Article by Major General Nguyen Huy Chuong: "A Strong Spirit of Criticism and Self-Criticism Brings About Confidence in Victory"]

[Text] From the very beginning, when studying the draft documents of the Fifth Party Congress, I have been very confident about one thing: the contents of the documents have manifested the spirit of strict self-criticism and straightforward struggle of our Party and the Party Central Committee. I have noted a strong transformation not only in the documents but also in our Party. I think that that spirit of straightforward struggle and strict self-criticism, and that strong internal transformation, have truly created a very fine political spirit throughout the Party.

In our Military Region 5, the Party congresses that were held at the various levels clearly manifested those characteristics. All of the congresses, from the basic level to the Military Region level, enthusiastically discussed the draft documents with a spirit of straightforward struggle and strict self-criticism, and mobilized the positive contributions of all Party members. The process of the Party congresses was a process of the Party organizations exercising strict self-criticism and of each Party member also strictly criticizing themselves. And all Party members, in the process of discussing the draft documents, realized more profoundly the documents of our Party and country and the difficulties of the situation and missions at present and in the future and, on that basis, clearly realized their responsibility of contributing their energy and intelligence. No Party members allowed themselves to become indifferent toward the situation. The Party organizations, units, and individual Party members took the initiative in resolving the difficulties and negative phenomena in all spheres of work. In 1981 the main-force units and local armed forces of Military Region 5 did a good job of carrying out their military training programs and created momentum favorable for the attainment of even greater accomplishments in 1982. The task of calling up youths for military service was carried out very effectively. The provinces in both the Central Highlands and the lowlands attained their norms. The mission of maintaining political security and social order was carried out well throughout the Military Region. With regard to self-sufficiency production, all of the units surpassed their norms and some units specializing in economic missions, such as lumbering in the An Khe area, tea production in Bien Ho, etc., began to earn profits. A number of units fulfilling international missions achieved outstanding accomplishments in all phases of their work.

With regard to that situation of the Military Region, I have a thought: the process of holding Party congresses at the various levels and the process of discussing the draft documents was also a process in which Military Region 5 promoted the "internal transformation" of the Party by means of more accurate resolutions with stronger force, and by means of struggle against all negative manifestations, the organization of an emulation movement to encourage revolutionary acts on the part of the masses, etc., which created a revolutionary spirit and an extremely valuable strength.

We are also profoundly aware that the immediate and long-range missions of our Party in general and of Military Region 5 in particular are very difficult and that there are still many difficulties and complications. Our Military Region itself still has many weaknesses and deficiencies. That situation demands, above all, that our Communist Party members and cadres continue to strictly improve their qualities and virtue and that they truly endeavor to fulfill their political responsibilities in order to improve their leadership ability, further promote the "internal transformation" in the Military Region 5 Party organizations, and create a new strength for the Military Region with regard to all missions and tasks.

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

STEPPED-UP EFFORTS TO RESOLVE BORDER-AREA PROBLEMS URGED

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 21 Mar 82 p 2

[Article by Major General Dam Van Nguy: "Create On-the-Spot Combat Strength, Solidly Defend the Border"]

[Text] Before I returned to Hanoi to participate in the current Party Congress I visited a number of units and localities in the border area. The troops and the ethnic minority people were all determined to stand and fight, to defend every inch of the border under all circumstances. They were very spirited and confident. That spirit and confidence were also present in the emulation movement to achieve accomplishments to celebrate the Party Congress.

In that border area the cadres and men and the ethnic minority people had many desires, thoughts, and opinions they wanted to be included in the discussions at the Party Congress. And they said that once there have been meticulous discussions and the Party and the desires of the people are in agreement, as expressed in the form of a resolution, the soldiers and people of the border region will implement it immediately, and will transform the Party's resolution into actual results in production labor and in a high degree of combat readiness.

In the actual situation at present, the people in the border area, at times and in places, do not have enough food or clothing. Those requirements are essential in life, production, and combat have been stated specifically and in accordance with the actual situation and the resolution of the Fourth Party Congress. Why, then, have we been unable to overcome those problems? I think that the reason is to be found in organization, implementation, and specific policies and measures. If policies and plans are one, measures must be ten or even more. Even if resolutions are correct and appropriate, if implementation is not good, lacks unity, and is not realistic, it cannot bring about good results.

The present difficulties in production, combat, and life cannot be overcome immediately by any one policy or measure. They can only be overcome in the course of a process of struggle, with the combined strength of many forces and many appropriate and creative measures. The border provinces are on the front line and directly confront the expansionist bandits, so it is even more important that they stand firm. The soldiers and people there are confident that with the success of the present Congress, and with correct resolutions that are transformed into

reality, the present and future difficulties can be overcome. We will cooperate closely with the local Party committees, concentrate our leadership and guidance, create seething, widespread revolutionary high tides among the masses, and victoriously implement the resolution of the Congress.

During the past several years, the people of nearly 20 ethnic minority groups in the Military Region, especially the ethnic minority people in the 13 districts and 64 villages along the border, have cooperated closely with the units and troops, in accordance with the slogan "the soldiers and people share the same will," and have taken the initiative in uncovering and effectively stopping all of the enemy's border violations and sabotage, and in maintaining political security and social order and safety. The on-the-spot strength for defending the border during the past several years has been the result of that determination and close cooperation. New fighting strength must also be created by means of close cooperation between the soldiers and the people and between the local Party committees and governmental administrations on the one hand and the army on the other hand. I would like to bring up those matters during the Congress and contribute opinions when they are discussed.

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CSO: 4209/300

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

VNSC SEEN AS URGING U.S. INTERVENTION

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 29 Mar - 11 Apr 82 pp 34-36

[Article by John Kelly]

[Text] A new U.S. intervention in southeast Asia is being advocated in the United States by the VNSC [Vietnam National Salvation Committee], which is almost more Reaganite than Reagan himself.

At the present time there is much talk about El Salvador possibly becoming the next U.S. Vietnam. But the next Vietnam for the United States might well be Vietnam itself, if the VNSC is allowed to have its way.

The VNSC, testifying before the House Subcommittee for Asian and Pacific Ocean Affairs, actually unveiled its apparently illegal conspiracy to bring about a resumption of war in Vietnam. In its view this attempt is in keeping with the "offensive" geostrategy called "rollback," being implemented by the Reagan administration against communism.

In all simplicity, the VNSC admitted that it wants to overthrow the Vietnamese government "through psychological warfare, and through military operations combined with diplomatic and political actions (sic) abroad."

Taking upon itself the right to speak in the name of the U.S. government, the VNSC told the subcommittee: "It is clear that Washington can no longer be content with its traditional policy of containment (with regard to communism), considering the fact that the front lines have now moved into Latin America, in El Salvador, at the very threshold of the United States. Washington has chosen a deliberately offensive policy in order to escape from the dilemmas of the containment policy. This rollback policy is being applied primarily to regions of the world not covered by the Yalta Agreements."

Although no one can say whether the U.S. government really supports the VNSC, the group states that "it naturally relies on the moral support and material assistance of the major powers in the Pacific and Asia, particularly China, the United States, Japan, and the ASEAN* [Association of Southeast Asian Nations]."

In any event, it is significant that the Justice Department has not indicted the VNSC, even though it has obviously violated the Neutrality Act. At worst, the total absence of any reaction by Washington allows the VNSC to use U.S. territory as its base of operations.

According to the VNSC, China is totally behind the resumption of war in Vietnam. The spokesman of the committee, Truong Nhu Tang, was apparently recently invited to visit the Peoples Republic of China, where it is reported that he met with Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang and with Prince Norodom Sihanouk.

And, still according to the VNSC, "China has decided to destabilize pro-Soviet regimes in Indochina by arming all movements hostile to Hanoi--whether they are communist or not--as well as minority ethnic and separatist groups."

A Global Strategy

Truong Nhu Tang, a former comptroller general of the Industrial and Commercial Bank of Vietnam, and former director of the national sugar mill, made a written deposition before the House Subcommittee on 15 October 1981. His written testimony, a real potpourri of anticommunist slogans and cliches, should warm the heart of any Reaganite.

Tang, comparing Vietnam first to "a new East Germany," and then to "a new Cuba," maintains that Vietnam "is organically an integral part of the Soviet Union today," with the intent and means of "exporting revolution beyond the borders of Indochina." Still according to Tang, Laos and Cambodia "are fated to be swallowed up by Vietnam in a sort of "Indochinese Pact," a small-scale and tropical version of the "Warsaw Pact." And, parroting the words of General Haig, Tang claims that "Hanoi is using toxic gases and chemical weapons to exterminate the Hmong people from Laos."

* This organization includes as its members Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines.

For good measure, Tang tossed in an allusion to a "Libyan connection," adding that the Soviet-Vietnamese friendship "directly endangers the commercial and military fleets of the west, especially of Japan and China (sic)."

"The struggle for a nation's independence depends first of all on the determination and decision of its people, and secondly, on foreign assistance." After this introductory remark made to the subcommittee, Tang discussed the need for the United States "to support resistance movements in Afghanistan, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, which form an integral part of the global strategy of allies fighting against common enemies." In particular, the "United States should this time support the opposition and popular movements" in Vietnam immediately, for "the time is ripe for a western success."

AN OLD TRICK

Tang, while pretending to abstain from such an action, actually encouraged the United States to intervene in a new war in Vietnam: "I have not come here to urge you to get involved in a new conflict, but that is the only way which can stop the hegemonist Soviets at the least cost and most effectively."

There is a major, obvious contradiction in Tang's remarks, however. He says that Vietnam is no longer a sovereign country because of its alliance with the USSR, and that the way to restore this sovereignty entails identification with the United States. Ironically, Tang himself says that "during the war years in Vietnam, many of us admired the actions of Hanoi, an independent, in the Sino-Soviet conflict." And he suggests that U.S. assistance to the "VNSC war" be used as a means of keeping China allied with the United States and separated from the Soviet Union which, in Tang's view, "should be more important than keeping Hanoi separated from Moscow. The relations between the United States and China are thus the decisive factor."* This is, therefore, a de facto admission that the "VNSC war" is being waged to make Vietnam dependent on the United States, and is in no way a war of independence.

"If the United States helps the resistance movement in Vietnam, the Vietnamese will remain in their country in order to fight for their independence and their liberty. They will no longer

* AFRIQUE-ASIE, no 261, 15 Mar 1982. "Objectives and Limits of the U.S. Alliance with China."

risk their lives to leave the country." These are the words of a second witness, Doan Van Toai, author of the book THE VIETNAMESE GULAG, speaking on 16 October 1981, before a House subcommittee. Toai is now a researcher at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in Massachusetts. Like Tang, he attempted to present the members of the VNSC and himself as former partisans of the FNL [National Liberation Front] who, one fine day, found themselves on the road to Damascus. In speaking of Tang, he said: "No one has more revolutionary credentials." And, of himself: "During the war years, I was one of the leaders of Saigon's students, and as such, I supported the FNL and opposed the U.S. intervention in Vietnam... I was arrested several times by the Thieu regime."

"The list of former highly-placed communist and Vietcong leaders is," in Toai's words, "very long." He rejects the notion that these "dissidents should be considered CIA puppets," adding that they are "well beyond the accusation of complicity with the CIA."

It is true that in this area Toai certainly knows what he is talking about, even though he "forgot" to make clear--wanting to pass himself off as a leftist--that, during the Vietnam war, he himself was a CIA agent, and that his arrests by Thieu were only an old coverup used to lend credit to his image as a leftist.

In secret documents of the Thieu regime in the possession of the journal COUNTERSPY*, Toai's activity is summed up in just three letters: "CIA." In 1966, Toai first worked for a certain Terry Rambo, as a translator for a social science research project financed by the U.S. Department of Defense. Arrested on 25 December 1969, for his participation in a cultural event entitled "Sing for My People," which was considered anti-war by the Thieu police, he was released a few days later.

The documents we mentioned claim that in 1969-1970, Toai met with U.S. agents (Moore and Collins) at the U.S. embassy in Saigon, and states again that Toai "is working for the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency." The documents also reveal that, on the occasion of a meeting with Nguyen Thien Nhon, a special adviser to Thieu's vice president, he assured him of his "moral support." In short, Toai was an agent of the foreign invader and, as such, was working against his compatriots and student

* Editor's Note: We have a copy of these documents.

friends. There can be no doubt that, by means of "indoctrination, "dollars," and "training," as recommended by the former CIA official, Richard M. Bissel, Jr, Toai developed "a second loyalty, more or less comparable to that of the Americans."

In this respect, it is of interest to read the evaluation that Toai makes of the Vietnam war: "an anguish-laden war that cost the United States 350,000 victims, \$300 billion, and an inestimable amount of lost pride, a war which saw its heroes (his word) scorned more than honored by their fellow citizens, a war that is just beginning to be appreciated at its true value." In all this, there is not one word about the sufferings of the Vietnamese people and about the scars inflicted on their homeland by the American invaders, whom Toai calls "heroes."

This is the Doan Van Toai who presents himself as--even brags of being--the new champion of Vietnamese independence, and who adds: "Both the left and the right must respect the principle of independence and liberty and must oppose invasion in all its forms." At the same time, the official program of the VNSC, which could have been written at CIA headquarters, speaks of the invasion of Vietnam by China as "the military lesson of February (sic) 1979."

This is the Doan Van Toai who asked the subcommittee: "Why isn't the United States today willing to spend any money at all on supporting the anticommunist people? Why doesn't the United States today want to help the Vietnamese who are fighting against the communists, while in the past, many Vietnamese were forced by the Americans to fight the communists?"

Although we don't know whether the U.S. government is providing military support for the activities of the VNSC, military actions of mercenaries supported by the United States recently took place in Laos which, according to the VNSC, is "occupied" by Vietnam. One of these raids, said to be organized by the CIA, was conducted by Laotian mercenaries who were implicated in arson.

In November 1981, the Pentagon's very new counter-terrorist tactical force gave Lt Col James G. Gritz, a former Green Beret, \$40,000 and special equipment for two commando units of Laotian mercenaries operating under the command of the former CIA agent and Laotian general Vang Pao. Five other Americans were involved in this operation, including Vincent W. Arnone, a former Green Beret and security consultant in Malden, Massachusetts. The two groups infiltrated Laos from Thailand on

15 November 1981, and it is not known now if they are still there. The official purpose of their mission: to obtain information on American prisoners of war who might still be in Laos. The Vietnamese minister of foreign affairs, Nguyen Co Thach, has accused the United States of using this alleged issue of the POWs as a "political weapon" against Vietnam. It may be of use to remark here that "paramilitary intelligence-gathering raids," to use the terminology of the CIA, the source of these raids, during the 1950s helped to provoke the first Vietnam war.

"An Interesting Character"

The former Green Beret Gritz told the BOSTON GLOBE that the counter-terrorist tactical force had also drawn up plans for two other incursions in Laos and Vietnam, on 10 December 1981. Gritz was to take part in this "Operation Eagle" as project leader and field man and, to do so, was to be returned to active duty. This means, if Gritz is telling the truth, that the U.S. government is supporting these raids. In any event, on 9 December 1981, the deputy director of the CIA, Bobby Ray Inman, was informed of this plan by Gritz, whom he found "an interesting character, full of good stories."

According to the BOSTON GLOBE, the raid scheduled for 10 December was called off because of bureaucratic infighting between the Defense Intelligence Agency and the counter-terrorist tactical force. But this did not stop Gritz from pursuing, on a personal level, the efforts he began in 1979 in order to penetrate Indochina using the pretext of saving American POWs. For this purpose, he could have unrestricted access to the intelligence gathered by the DIA from U.S. agents, from satellites and reconnaissance aircraft. We have found that he also has close contacts with the CIA. Representative Dornan, commenting on Gritz's efforts, told the BOSTON GLOBE: "I think no obstacle should stop the government in its search for POWs who are still alive over there. And if necessary, we should make use of the private sector to do this."

The counter-terrorist tactical force receives its own intelligence data and has its hands left almost free to undertake paramilitary operations in liaison with mercenaries and the "private sector." Its ability to engage in provocative actions, identical to acts of war, was demonstrated by the group preceding it, which was responsible for the military incursion in Iran, attempting to rescue the American hostages, which ended in its well known failure.

More recently, BUSINESS WEEK reported that the FULRO [Front United for the Struggle of the Oppressed Races] had undertaken military actions in the high plateaus of South Vietnam, and was using U.S. weapons, as well as others supplied by the Chinese and the Khmer Rouge. This FULRO is claimed to have as its members men belonging to the Jarai, Rhade, and Bahnar tribes, and it claims to have formed a clandestine government with Chok Nie Krieng as its president, and Y Drun Nie as minister of foreign affairs.

These military actions accord perfectly with the tactics defined by the VNSC, for which it is asking for the support of the U.S. government.

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

DEVELOPMENT OF MILITIA, SELF-DEFENSE FORCES IN MEKONG DELTA DISCUSSED

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 24 Mar 82 p 2

[Article by Major General Ho Ba Phuc, Deputy Commander of Military Region 9 and a Delegate to the Fifth Party Congress: "Building Militia and Self-Defense Forces: a Task Necessary for the Good Fulfillment of the Two Strategic Missions at the Present Time in the Mekong Delta Region"]

[Text] An I traveled to Hanoi to participate in the Party Congress, the fields along National Route 4 were the bright gold color of ripe grain. This season, thanks to good weather and the application of new policies in agriculture, the Mekong Delta will have a successful crop. Many localities in Hau Giang are harvesting early rice plantings. Arriving here via the fragrance of rice in Thap Muoi to participate in the Party Congress, I am very confident.

In the mission of defending the homeland, the Mekong Delta is a rear area in the fight against the Chinese expansionists and their lackeys, who are attempting to impede the inevitable advance of the Kampuchean revolution. A problem that is posed is how to enable the Mekong Delta rear area to become truly strong.

First of all, I believe that in order to have that strength it is necessary to pay attention to teaching consciousness of national defense to the cadres and people, to enable everyone to fully understand the organic relationship between the two strategic missions at the present time: building and defending the homeland. In that regard, I recommend that in the mission of building national defense by all the people the Party clearly indicate what the localities in the south, including the Mekong Delta, must do to combine economics with national defense and national defense with security. That is a major problem that must be carefully discussed after the Congress, and there must be specific plans that are appropriate to the circumstances of each locality.

During recent years, the local Party committee echelons and governmental administrations in Military Region 9 have been concerned with leading and guiding the fulfillment of those two strategic missions. However, at times and in places, with regard to some tasks the combining of economic with national defense and of national defense with security has not been tight, complete, or unified. The task of simultaneously carrying out those two strategic missions is new and difficult. Especially in the Mekong Delta, which has not been liberated very long,

difficulties are being encountered in organizing living conditions and developing production, so it is necessary to further strengthen the building and consolidation of base-level Party bases, governmental administrations, and mass organizations.

In order to combine economics with rational defense and rational defense with security it is necessary to apply many combined measures, with the positive participation of many forces, and continually implement them in all base-level units and localities in the Military Region. But the most essential, all-embracing thing is to gradually create a basis on which to develop the districts into military bastions; gradually, on the basis of the collective production forms, build strong agricultural-industrial districts; and do a good job of fulfilling the mission of socialist transformation and socialist construction in all Mekong Delta provinces.

In gradually developing the districts into military bastions, the localities in Military Region 9 have made many efforts to build strong militia and self-defense forces at the base level. During the past several years such districts as Lap Vo and Hong Nui in Dong Thap, Chau Thanh in An Giang, Long Phu in Hau Giang, An Bien in Kien Giang, and a number of other localities have made many all-out efforts to build and consolidate militia and self-defense forces. However, in general the quality of the activities of the militia and self-defense forces is not yet uniform. Some places overemphasize form or large-scale organization, but their actual results are low. I believe that there are many reasons why the militia and self-defense forces are not yet strong and have not yet met the requirements of the present missions. One of the direct reasons is that the Party committees and governmental administrations in the localities are not yet been "strong handed militia" and are not yet "in harmony" with the urgent requirements of the present situation and missions.

During the coming period, when implementing all tasks intended to victoriously implement the resolution of the Fifth Party Congress, Military Region 9 will pay special attention to building up the militia and self-defense forces. What must be stressed is that those forces can truly become the hard core in production, building a new life, defending order and security, training, and maintaining combat readiness. In the present situation, the production and security maintenance of the base are posing necessary preconditions. Like it or not, the militia and self-defense forces must play the hard-core role in production and in protecting security.

Military Region 9 has a rather large area covering eight Mekong Delta provinces, which stretches more than 800 kilometers long, includes more than 400 large and small islands, has a dense network of rivers, streams, and canals, and has a border with Cambodia. Those geographical characteristics clearly demonstrate the complicated nature of Military Region 9 and considerably influence the maintenance of order and security. If security is not well maintained, many difficulties will be encountered in production and combat-readiness training. During the past several years, the militia and self-defense forces in the localities in the border, coast, and island areas have achieved many outstanding accomplishments. The militia and self-defense forces discovered, and participated in pursuing, apprehending, or stopping, more 80 percent of the incidents regarding political

security and social order and safety. In the collective livelihood movement to create the bases on which to create agricultural cooperatives, the militia of the localities have enthusiastically volunteered and positively encouraged the masses to participate. The self-defense forces aboard state fishing boats have also contributed notably to maintaining security at sea.

The actual situation at the base level during the recent period has affirmed that in localities with strong Party committees, solid governmental administrations and mass organizations with good activities, and which are truly concerned with building and consolidating the movement, the militia and self-defense movement is strong. At present, in Military Region 9 65 percent of the village-level units and 43 percent of the district-level units have good militia-self defense movement. These ratios are still low in comparison to the requirements. We must, however, by 1965, raise those ratios to 85 and 94 percent. It will not be easy to attain those quality ratios. But if the Party committee echelons and governmental administrations have a high degree of determination, continually stress that task, positively gain experience, and discover and "propagate" progressive models, I am certain that they can be attained. The actual effectiveness of the activities of the militia and self-defense forces depends greatly on the quality of each cadre and enlisted man and of each militia and self-defense detachment, on the organizational scale and table of organization, and on the clear determination of the missions of each key area and zone. The question of whether those things are done well and correctly or not depends on whether the Party committees at the base level are concerned with close leadership and guidance.

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LIBRARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

PRE-CONGRESS INTERVIEW ON ETHNIC MINORITY TRAINING

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 26 Mar 82 p 2

Interview with Maj Gen Van Giang by Le Nhu Tien: "Navy Endeavors To Increase Its Fighting Strength, Strongly Defend the Waters of the Homeland"; date and place not specified

[7/81] Before the convening of the Fifth Party Congress, a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN reporter interviewed Major General Van Giang, Deputy Commander of the Navy and a delegate to the Congress. The following are some of the opinions exchanged between the reporter and the Deputy Commander.

Reporter: Our territorial waters are an inseparable part of our homeland. Please let us know what the naval personnel think about their responsibility of defending those sacred waters of the homeland.

Major General Van Giang: Our country has a coastline 3,260 kilometers long, nearly half of our total land border. From the military point of view, the enemy pays much attention to that characteristic and takes advantage of it. The history of our nation has recorded many brilliant feats of arms against foreign aggressors on the rivers and seas.

That is correct! Our territorial seas and skies are inseparable parts of our homeland. We cannot successfully build socialism if the enemy is free to harass us day and night. Our navy, a force which defends our nation at a distance, realizes its responsibility to defeat the enemy as soon as they sneak into our territorial waters. In a wider sense, we must be the masters of our homeland's territorial waters every day and every hour.

Reporter: Would you tell us what is involved in mastering our territorial waters?

Major General Van Giang: The mission of mastering the homeland's territorial waters reflects the new characteristics and requirements of war to defend the motherland. It also manifests the outstanding development and combat strength of our navy and the other forces defending the territorial waters.

To master our territorial waters is to fulfill the requirements of defeating the enemy when they violate our territorial waters; ensuring the freedom of action of our navy in our territorial waters; ensuring that the people are free to engage in activities on our rivers and seas, etc. If we are to be the masters, first of all

our navy must coordinate with the relevant forces in controlling and patrolling all of our territorial waters.

Reporter: What do you think about the objective of building professional, modern armed forces within the sphere of the navy?

Major General Van Giang: The navy is an armed forces branch with relatively modern equipment. But modernity must be tied in very closely with professionalism. If the level of professionalism is low and does not keep up with the level of modernity of the technical equipment, our fighting strength will be low and there will be times when we damage those modern weapons and facilities.

We are now concentrating, and will continue to concentrate, on two aspects: improving the capability of the commanders, especially the ability of the ship captains to organize and implement; and absolutely observing the professional systems and practices in three aspects: using, maintaining, and repairing machinery and equipment. Only if that is done will combat readiness be meaningful.

Reporter: If, in the view of the recent incident in which our self-defense militia captured on the spot a Chinese ship that had violated our territorial waters, do you have any opinions regarding the continuous raising of the combat readiness level?

Major General Vang Giang: In the present situation, the enemy is always eager to sabotage our great undertaking of national construction. Thus it may be said that there is never any peace for our navy. At all times our cadres and men must be ready. The entire distant observation apparatus: communications, radar, the position-finding and alert systems, etc., must be in good operating order. There must be close coordination between the forces -- between the navy and the air forces, between the navy and the artillery, between the navy and the missile forces, and between the navy and the border defense troops and the self-defense militia in the territorial waters -- in order to promptly surround the enemy with a combination of forces. We must deploy a strong battle position at sea, ensure a high degree of mobility, and take the initiative in attacking the enemy secretly and unexpectedly.

Only with a high degree of vigilance can we be prepared to fight immediately and take the initiative from the very beginning.

During the time when the Party is preparing to hold its Congress our naval units, in the Paracel Islands, at Phu Quoc, at Bach Long Vi, etc., and in all other areas, offer to the Party hundreds of accomplishments that serve the requirements of combat readiness and victorious combat.

END: 42 9/31

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

STEPPED-UP TRAINING OF ETHNIC MINORITY CADRES URGED

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 26 Mar 82 p 2

[Article by Colonel Le Van Hai, Commander of Group B56, delegate to the Fifth Party Congress: "Step Up the Training of Ethnic Minority Cadres:"]

[Text:] The area of operations of my unit is a high-altitude, rough-terrain border area. The nature of war to defend the socialist homeland is posing many problems with which the Party must be concerned, including the problem of stepping up the training of ethnic minority cadres.

Our border with China extends thousands of kilometers. The terrain is almost all mountainous. The people who have traditionally inhabited that area -- principally such ethnic minority people as the Mong, Dao, Nhang, Giay, Tay, Thai, etc. -- are distant from the political, economic, and cultural centers. In some places the political level is still low, the old habits and customs are still dominant, superstitions have not yet been eliminated, and the cultural levels are not uniform. In some places the people have returned to individual livelihood.

At the same time, the enemy are carrying out very wily and insidious plots and schemes. They are trying to sabotage us economically, politically, culturally, militarily, etc., and to create division among the ethnic minority groups and between the troops and the people. They are taking advantage of the traditional ties between the people on both sides of the border to sneak into our country and commit sabotage. They are taking advantage of people who have a low level of consciousness and vigilance, colluding with dissatisfied people to carry out counterrevolutionary activities. At present they are setting up border markets to harm us economically, exchanging psychological warfare goods for water buffalo horns and hoofs, vegetables, corn, anise oil, camellia oil, etc., and continually spreading rumors and making up stories in order to cause trouble, win over credulous people, etc.

The local military forces' mission of fighting to defend the local areas is closely related to the local sectors, governmental administrations, and people. In order to have high combat effectiveness there must be cadres and men with good tactical and technical ability who are familiar with the terrain, grasp the political situation among the people, and understand the people, in order to defend the people and the accomplishments of the revolution.

The local cadres have not yet been strengthened or received supplementary training. A number of old, prestigious cadres have already retired and will continue to retire. The young cadres have little experience. Only 25 percent of the local troops are ethnic minority people, while 75 percent are people from the lowlands.

I believe that giving supplementary training to, and increasing the number of, ethnic minority cadres in the jungle-and-mountains region are necessary steps with long-range effects.

In the army, in order to encourage the ethnic minority cadres and men to serve for a long time and become people who are loyal to the revolution and to the Party, there must be specific policies. For example, the 3-year program is not appropriate for training officers who are members of ethnic minority groups. They are better at action than at theory. There must be a separate program, which must receive the attention of the various echelons, or else the service time of the ethnic minority cadres in the high-altitude area should be longer than that of lowland cadres, for the ethnic minority people usually listen to older people.

In the great enterprise of strongly defending the socialist homeland, in order to organize forces to carry on the revolutionary undertaking of the Party in the future it is necessary to strengthen and supplement the ethnic minority cadres wherever necessary. They must be people who have a high degree of political consciousness who are willing to sacrifice for the revolution and the people, have profound consciousness of vigilance toward the enemy, are capable of raising the consciousness of the masses, etc., in order to create a high degree of solidarity between the army and the people and victoriously fulfill the strategic missions of the Party: building and strongly defending our socialist homeland.

901b
CSC: 4209/301

PART: ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT

LE DUAN SPEECH AT 8TH VCP PLENUM

Phan NHOAN DAN in Vietnamese 22 Mar 82 p 2

[Header] This speech delivered by Le Duan at the 8th Plenum of the 4th Party Central Committee: "Le Duan on Socialist Collective Ownership"]

[Text] The thinking of collective ownership was set forth by the classicists. Marx, Engels and Lenin pointed out that socialism is a system in which man begins to become the master of society, the master of nature, the master of himself, a system in which the dominant factors are "the sense of community" and the "collectiveness," is the highest stage of development in the evolution of man. Collective ownership is not merely a matter of consciousness and sentiment, rather, it is primarily a system of political, economic, cultural and social relationships that consistently reflect the working people as the collective masters of the state. It is this system of relationships that determines the nature and characteristics of the new, socialist society and that makes the new society qualitatively different from every other society that has existed in the history of our country.

The system of ownership relations reflects the superior nature of the new system and creates a tremendous force for transforming and building the economy, developing the culture, building the new life and molding the new man. In our advance from small-scale production directly to socialism with virtually nothing by way of material-technical bases, our strongest base is the strength of collective ownership. As a result, immediately adopting collective ownership, beginning with the ownership of land and labor, and immediately establishing the initial bases of the system of collective ownership are matters in the nature of laws in the advance to socialism in our country.

In this connection, I would like to emphasize a very important point in the draft of the new constitution, namely, putting all arable land under national ownership. This decision is totally consistent with the law of advancing to socialism, consistent with the actual situation regarding our country's cropland and consistent with the interests of all of society as well as with the interests of farmers themselves. In fact, the principle of socialism is that all basic instruments of production must belong to everyone. The socialist state must establish unified planning and adopt policies for reasonably developing, making

appropriate investments in, preserving and improving the arable land throughout the country as well as within each economic area so that all arable land is used to support our population of more than 50 million and so that agriculture advances to large-scale socialist production in order to competently support the industrialization of the country. This can only occur when all arable land has been put under national ownership. Although under national ownership, an important percentage of cropland will be assigned to cooperative collectives and private farmers to use and enjoy the fruits of their labor in accordance with the law; households that are now using cropland will, of course, be allowed to continue to use it. When using arable land, both collectives and individuals are responsible for preserving, improving and using it in accordance with the policies and plans of the state.

Only the system of socialist collective ownership establishes the correct relationship between society and the individual. Here, collective ownership on the part of the entire social community of Vietnam has been established and the genuine freedom of the individual is thoroughly upheld, thereby encouraging every creative talent of the individual and establishing unity and harmony between the individual and society. It is incorrect to not see or resolutely rely upon the strength of the entire community but it is a mistake to not see the legitimate nature, the important, essential role of the individual. Coordinating society and the collective with the individual and making full use of the strength of the collective as well as the capabilities of each person are correct guidelines for developing each potential of the country, especially in the field of organizing, utilizing and managing labor.

One basic element of the system of socialist collective ownership is the organic link between rights and obligations, between obligations and rights. Each citizen is equal in terms of his or her obligations and rights and each must fulfill certain obligations, such as defending the fatherland, working to build the country and so forth; at the same time, each enjoys certain political, economic, cultural and social rights. Anyone who is able to work has the right to work and must work and, at the same time, is remunerated on the basis of the labor he or she contributes. Separating obligations from rights, rights from obligations is contrary to the nature of the collective ownership system. In this spirit, we must resolutely criticize such deviations in economic management as giving light attention to economic measures, being lax in the use of administrative measures, placing heavy emphasis upon orders but not being appropriately concerned with organizing the material and cultural lives of the masses and not creating the conditions for people who earn legitimate livings to increase their income and produce more wealth for society. At the same time, we must, in this spirit, steadfastly teach citizens the new attitude toward work and teach the sense of responsibility toward building and defending the fatherland. The implementation of the system of collective ownership first of all demands the correct implementation of the articles of the Constitution concerning the obligations and rights of the citizen.

Within the system of collective ownership, the interests of society, the interests of each collective and the interests of each worker are identical. The oneness of

Three interests is a basic characteristic of the system of socialist management and is a very important moving force in building the new society, developing the economy and accelerating production. As is the case with the clauses of the new Constitution, the specific policies regarding economic management and social management must reflect this basic characteristic. The failure to give attention to establishing the oneness of the three interests is a long-standing shortcoming in economic management and social management, one that has created many negative phenomena in productive labor, one that has not only prevented the economy from developing upon, but which has also diminished the fine nature and the tremendous strength of the collective ownership system.

We know that the interests of the masses are fully satisfied and, at the same time, the economy is developing upon the strength of collective ownership, the system of collective ownership must be simultaneously implemented on three basic levels: the national level, the local level and the basic level. This is an objective requirement of the development of society. Coordinating ownership on a nationwide scale with ownership within each locality and ownership within each installation will facilitate unity and centralization with the broadening of democracy; avoid decentralization and division while combating bureaucratic centralism; be consistent with the problems of production and meet the requirements of the system of socialist distribution; and coordinate the overall strength of the entire country with the specific strength of each locality, each unit. The articles of the new Constitution dealing with the functions and tasks of the various levels of the government must be generalized and amended by policies on the organization of production and economic management and social management, on maintaining the standard of living of the people and on insuring the construction of the material-technical bases of socialism, policies that fully reflect the system of collective ownership on the three basic levels and which correct the present duplication and contradiction among the central level, the local level and the basic level.

The foundation of collective ownership must be based on the new, socialist economy. Without a system of large-scale, socialist production as its material base, the system of collective ownership cannot be fully implemented because, as Lenin said, the level of democracy must be higher than the level of economic development. Therefore, making every effort to build the new economy is the most important task of our people, of all levels of government, from the central to the basic level. In conjunction with building the economy, the proletarian state has the responsibility of gradually establishing the new culture and molding the new, socialist man, realizing them to be important moving forces stimulating the socialist revolution.

1957
1958-1959/1960

ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

POLICY ON ENTERPRISES REVISED TO PROVIDE INCENTIVE

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 22 Mar 82 pp 1, 4

[Editorial: "The Production and Business Initiative and the Financial Independence of Enterprises"]

[Text] In order to carry out the policy on improving the planning and management mechanism of state-operated enterprises, it is necessary to continue to implement decision number 28-CP with necessary amendments and revisions. These amendments and revisions are designed to continue to expand the production and business initiative and the financial independence of enterprises on the basis of making the plan the center of enterprise operations and providing incentive and the conditions for the basic units to develop their production capacity as best possible, produce many products for society and correctly coordinate the three interests.

Every state-operated enterprise is a cell of the system of social production, is an installation of the socialist economy. The improvement of planning must be closely linked to management policies and regulations in order to insure that enterprises are truly the masters of their plans and formulate their plans from the installation level upward in accordance with the guidelines of cost accounting and socialist business. The plans of enterprises must reflect creativity and initiative in the production and business of the basic units and insure the effectiveness and the legal nature of the state plan. As a result, the entire plan of the enterprise formulated on the basis of materials supplied by the state and materials acquired by the enterprise itself is a unified plan and is approved by the upper level.

Supplies for production are an issue of major importance. In order to make full use of production capabilities and machine capacity, in addition to the supplies provided by the state, enterprises have the right to develop many different forms of supplementary sources of supplies: trading with other state-operated enterprises, purchasing additional products from the collective and private economies, borrowing foreign currency in order to import supplies and working as subcontractors for other units. The development of these sources of supplies is governed by principles and regulations of the state governing the management of supplies, foreign trade, foreign currency and prices.

...state-operated enterprises, regardless of the source of the raw materials used to produce them, are part of the commodity fund of the state. On the basis of fully complying with the production and marketing plan of the state, the marketing of products is carried out in accordance with the plan and distribution policy of the state. If products are sold on the open market, which are not under the exclusive management of the state, the enterprise is responsible for distribution and circulation, the enterprise is responsible for submitting all revenues for inclusion in the budget. Enterprise wholesale prices and product marketing prices are determined in accordance with the principle of compensating for the reasonable production costs of enterprises, which includes the purchase of necessary raw materials and supplies at negotiated prices, thereby insuring that the enterprise obtains an appropriate profit and that the state has a source of budget revenues in accordance with price management regulations.

Enterprise profits are an objective reflection of production and business efficiency. In order to prevent enterprises from increasing their profits on the basis of price differences, the profit margin for products of the same type must be the same, with the distinction made for the price of the raw materials used to produce them. The guideline regarding profits, including the establishment of profit margins and the various ratios involved in the distribution of profits, is to provide incentive for enterprises to improve their product quality and reduce their production costs so that basic units and workers receive the greatest benefit when they complete and exceed their state plan quotas. The size of bonus funds must be determined in accordance with the level of increase of labor productivity and production; on the other hand, they must partially compensate for the disproportionate difference in income among the various sectors and types of enterprises.

When determining the distribution of profits from one sector to another and one type of enterprise to another, the various ratios on profit distribution percentages and the size of bonuses must be determined in accordance with the principle of providing incentive for the key sectors and the other key sectors.

In order to ensure the initiative and the financial independence of enterprises, the cost accounting system must be improved well on the basis of correctly complying with the requirements of the revision to this decision. The requirement of the revision to this decision is that the production and business operations of enterprises are carried out on the basis of a complete and accurate cost accounting that clearly records costs based on actual production costs and not on high prices. The cost accounting system must be improved in order to provide for planning production costs, improving quota work, improving the management of materials, combating waste and misappropriation and improving the management of production and business. Accounting methods must be improved, and the system must be easy to implement and audit.

The measures and revisions set forth above will be concretized in the form of regulations and documents providing guidance from the various state agencies. With the implementation of the revision to decision number 25-JP will lay the basis for a new enterprise management system that is consistent with the immediate requirements of the state. The continued implementation of this decision must be closely

linked to urgent efforts to reorganize production and reorganize a number of basic jobs in enterprises management (such as the setting of quotas, cost accounting and reports-statistics); at the same time, we must accelerate the improvement of general management policies and regulations that are directly related to the production and business of installations.

7809

CSO: 4209/298

ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

ECONOMICAL, EFFECTIVE USE OF MATERIALS STRESSED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 25 Mar 82 p 1

[Editorial: "Management of Materials"]

[Text] As the need for materials of the national economy grows larger everyday, in addition to stepping up production and exploiting domestic supply sources, every year the state imports a considerable volume of materials. These sources of materials are not enough to satisfy every need. To gradually overcome a lack of balance in this regard and to ensure development of production, we must implement a policy of total economy and make the use of materials more effective. That is the direct task of materials management in regard to both supply and use.

Good materials management means first of all to ensure the timely use of materials for the right purpose by the right person, in accordance with the set standards and norms, and with a rational degree of concentration for the urgent economic tasks in order to bring about great results. Secondly, to try to gradually replace the imported materials with domestic materials. Thirdly, to reduce to a minimum losses of materials in storage and circulation. Fourthly, to organize the retrieval and full use of remnants, discarded materials and waste. And fifthly, to actively bring the excess materials now lying idle out of overstock and to put them into production and construction.

In spite of efforts in materials management, the common situation now is the fact that some sectors, localities and basic units not only use materials beyond the norms for incorrect purposes but also allow losses and long idleness to happen. In 1981, although the quantities of materials being put to use late because of slow rotation were twice as large as those of 1980, they were not equal even to one-third of the known quantities of idle materials.

The above-mentioned situation was the result of many factors ranging from planning of materials needs to management of supply and use. The setting of norms for materials needs was not yet truly based on the goals of production and business plans and rate of materials consumption for a unit product or job. Many localities

still set their norms by using rough estimates and raising the projected figures to a higher level as a precaution against "cuts" by the superior echelons; others were concerned only about their own units and requested materials that they would not need just to store for later use. Management of materials supply was organized in such a way as being scattered and thinly spread, nor did it ensure staying close to production and linked with production installations. A number of supply organs considered completing distribution within the set norms the end of their task and paid little attention to the results brought about by the materials they had distributed. The use of materials remained a matter of personal convenience, with no respect for the already approved consumption norms. Control of materials use has not yet become routine. Such a way of working to suit one's convenience has hampered the distribution, supply and storage of materials and led to surpluses here and shortages there and unstable needs.

To overcome the above-mentioned shortcomings and to further strengthen materials management is the direct responsibility of the materials sector and all production sectors as well. A number of sectors, localities and production installations, in coordination with regional materials supply federations, recently organized control of materials use, considered and asserted the level of materials consumption in the making of a unit product, classified users and maintained full control over their goods, for the purpose of maintaining balance and more accurate distribution of materials for every quarter. By changing the way to calculate the average of specific weight in connection with gasoline and oil consumption by adopting calculations of actual weight in different places, months and seasons, many localities succeeded in making considerable fuel savings. By making adjustments based on actual level of coal consumption while comparing it with the registered figures in 43 factories, Hanoi succeeded in saving more than 27,000 tons of coal, etc. Similar results obtained in many localities are proof that there is a great possibility of using materials even more effectively and economically if we can overcome in time the shortcomings in our management, including all of its links from planning, distribution, norm setting and supply to use. As an immediate job, we must have a full knowledge of the inventories of all sectors, localities and consumption units so as to have a basis for setting norms for stocks and rational reserves and to put to use in time the materials now lying idle. We must reorganize and strengthen the ways we use to measure, control and analyze materials and commodities and do a good job in connection with taking notes, making statistics, doing accounting and maintaining balance sheets of materials consumption.

Every sector, every echelon and every producer and business person must have the duty to contribute to good management of materials to make sure that every energy and raw material unit is used in the most effective manner and quickly contributes to manufacturing products for society.

VIETNAM: PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

CENTRAL HIGHLANDS PRODUCTION LEVELS FOR 1981 REPORTED

-HANOI: THANH DAI 11 Vietnamese 21 Mar 82 p 1

[Title: "Three Central Highlands Provinces Mobilize Compatriots of the Ethnic Minorities To Unite and Emulate in the Implementation of the State Plan"]

[Text: "In an enthusiastic movement to celebrate the party congress, the three Central Highlands provinces of Lam Dong, Dac Lac and Gia Lai-Kontum have mobilized the compatriots of the various ethnic minorities to strengthen their unity, increase production and implement the state plan.

In Lam Dong Province, due to a prolonged drought, grain output in 1981 only equaled 84 percent of the plan quota but the purchase of grain exceeded the plan quota by 6 percent, which represents a 6 percent increase compared to 1980, with the quantity of grain mobilized under obligations exceeding the plan quota by 6 percent. Rice, corn, buffalo herds and cattle herds exceeded the plan quotas and increased compared to 1980. The quantity of pork, live weight, purchased increased more than 100 percent.

The province mobilized laborers from various places to build new economic zones, and exceeded its plan quota by 11 percent, a 56 percent increase compared to 1980. The amount of land cleared exceeded the plan quota by 41, a 93 percent increase compared to 1980; the amount of land put into use exceeded the plan quota by 10 percent, a 3 percent increase compared to 1980.

The province's industrial sector equalled 91 percent of the plan quota and the amount of industrial goods purchased exceeded the plan quota by 96 percent, a 10 percent increase compared to 1980.

The province's retail trade on the organized market and the volume of goods purchased from the state for exportation exceeded the plan quota and the value of goods sold increased compared to 1980.

The province was hit by serious drought during the summer-fall season and experienced flooding at the end of the year. The amount of area under the cultivation of grain and grain output declined, especially the output of potatoes and beans; however, the amount of area under the cultivation of annual industrial

crops, such as beans, peanuts and so forth, increased by more than 400 hectares compared to 1980. Grain purchases equalled the plan quota. The hog herd was maintained; the purchase of agricultural products and food products exceeded the plan quota by 131 percent; and the quantity of timber delivered to the state exceeded the plan quota by 11 percent.

The various types of industrial goods, export goods and retail goods exceeded plan quotas.

Ha Lai-Kontum Province, which also experienced difficulties with the weather, failed to complete its grain output plan for 1981; however, its grain purchases equalled 97 percent of the plan quota, a 20 percent increase compared to 1980, with the amount of grain mobilized under obligations exceeding the plan quota by 41 percent, an 80 percent increase over 1980. The hog herd failed to meet the plan but did increase by 4 percent compared to 1980. The buffalo and cattle herds met and exceeded plan quotas. The quantity of pork, live weight, agricultural products and food products purchased did not meet the plan but did increase more than two-fold compared to 1980. The quantity of timber delivered to the state exceeded the plan quota by 5 percent.

The output value of local industry did not meet the plan but did increase 12 percent compared to 1980. Industrial goods and retail goods exceeded the plan and recorded increases compared to 1980.

Ha Lai-Kontum Province accepted more laborers to build new economic zones than planned and more than in 1980.

During the past year, all three provinces of the Central Highlands exceeded their military induction plan quotas and made many efforts in the areas of national defense and security work.

7539

000: 4299/297

AGRICULTURE

COASTAL PROVINCES PRODUCTION EFFORTS FOR 1981 REPORTED

HANOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 20 Mar 82 p 1

[Hanoi News Release: "The Seven Coastal Provinces of Central Vietnam Overcome the Difficulties Caused by Natural Disasters and Complete Many Norms of the State Plan"]

[Text] The seven coastal provinces of central Vietnam have made much progress in their emulation movement to report achievements in celebration of the party congress.

Quang Nam-Da Nang Province is focusing its efforts on agricultural production. The output of grain, in paddy equivalent, has exceeded the plan quota by 10 percent, which represents a 90 percent increase compared to 1980. Grain purchases have exceeded the plan by 29 percent. This is the first year in which Quang Nam-Da Nang has achieved self-sufficiency in grain and delivered grain to the central level. The production of annual industrial crops, such as peanuts and sesame, and the production of vegetables, subsidiary food crops and food products have also increased rapidly. The number of hogs has exceeded the plan quota by 35 percent, a 10 percent increase compared to 1980. The buffalo and cattle herds developed well and increased compared to 1980. The amount of area that was planted with new forests and cultivated exceeded the plan quota. The quantity of timber delivered to the state equalled the quota and represented a 35 percent increase compared to 1980. The total output value of local industry exceeded the plan quota by 60 percent. The production of agricultural products, food products and industrial goods as well as retail sales and export goods exceeded the plan quotas. All localities of the province made many efforts to provide a full supply of the state products governed by ration standards to cadres, manual workers and troops. Military inductions exceeded the quota by 2 percent.

Thua Thien Province, which encountered difficulties as a result of flooding at the end of the year, grain output, in paddy equivalent, met the plan quota. The output of hogs, live weight, exceeded the quota by 50 percent, the buffalo herd exceeded the quota by 2 percent and the ocean fish catch exceeded the quota by 15 percent. Afforestation and the cultivation of forests exceeded the plan quotas; the quantity of timber delivered to the state exceeded the plan quota by 34 percent.

The total output value of local industry exceeded the plan quota by 7 percent. Many efforts were made in the purchasing of grain; purchases exceeded the plan quota by 66 percent and exceeded the purchases made in 1980 by 36 percent. The volume of industrial goods, agricultural products and food products purchased exceeded the plan quotas by 6 to more than 40 percent. The goods delivered for exportation exceeded the plan quota by 252 percent.

Phu Khanh Province focused its efforts on accelerating production and overcoming the difficulties caused by natural disasters. The output of grain, in paddy equivalent, equalled 95 percent of the plan quota and the hog herd, although not meeting the plan quota, still increased by 13 percent compared to 1980; the buffalo herd equalled the plan quota and increased 7 percent compared to 1980; and the cattle herd increased 4 percent compared to 1980. The output of ocean fish developed rather well, exceeding the plan quota by 101 percent.

Despite the decline in grain production, grain purchases still exceeded the plan quota by 9 percent and increased 33 percent compared to 1980. The quantity of pork, live weight, purchased exceeded the plan quota by 11 percent. The quantity of timber delivered by the state exceeded the plan quota by 41 percent. The total output value of local industry exceeded the plan quota by 7 percent, export goods delivered to the state exceeded the plan quota by 725 percent and the volume of industrial goods purchased exceeded the plan quota by 46 percent. The total volume of retail sales exceeded the plan quota by 35 percent.

Tran Hai Province was also hit heavily by floods and grain output declined; however, the output of pork, live weight, exceeded the plan quota by 56 percent, the hog herd increased 27 percent compared to 1980 and the output of ocean fish exceeded the plan quota by 7 percent. The amount of grain, in paddy equivalent, purchased exceeded the plan quota by 2 percent and represented a 17 percent increase compared to 1980. The amount of pork, live weight, purchased increased more than two-fold compared to 1980. The purchasing of agricultural products and food products exceeded the plan quota by 35 percent.

Despite unfavorable natural conditions, Binh Tri Thien Province still tried to accelerate agricultural production and exceeded its plan quotas in all three areas: the amount of area under cultivation, yields and output. The hog herd exceeded the plan quota by 2 percent. Pork, live weight, exceeded the plan quota by 42 percent. The buffalo herd nearly met the plan quota and increased 4 percent compared to 1980. The cattle herd equalled 100 percent of the plan quota. The output of ocean fish exceeded the plan quota by 4 percent. The amount of area planted with new forests and cultivated as well as the quantity of timber delivered to the state also came close to meeting plan quotas. The amount of grain, in paddy equivalent, that was purchased increased 37 percent compared to 1980. The total output value of local industry equalled 96 percent of the plan quota. Industrial goods, agricultural products, food products and retail goods of the state and collective sector exceeded plan quotas. Military inductions met the plan quota.

Thanh Hoa Province made many efforts in agricultural production. The output of grain, in paddy equivalent, exceeded the plan quota by 3 percent. The hog herd, buffalo herd and cattle herd exceeded the plan quota. The quantity of grain, in paddy equivalent, purchased exceeded the plan quota by 16 percent. The output of ocean fish, the amount of area planted with new forests and the forest land cultivated met the plan quotas. The industrial goods, export goods and total retail sales in the state-operated and collective sectors exceeded plan quotas by rather large amounts. Military inductions met the plan quota.

In 1980, Thanh Hoa Province experienced many serious natural disasters; in 1981, it made many major efforts in agricultural production. Grain output exceeded the plan quota by 9 percent. The amount of area under the cultivation of winter crops exceeded the plan quota by 19 percent. The cattle herd developed rather well, exceeding the plan quota by 2 percent. The amount of grain, in paddy equivalent, agricultural products and food products purchased exceeded the plan quota by 42 percent. The induction of youths into the army met the plan quota.

7809

CSO: 4209/297

AGRICULTURE

EFFECTIVE USE, MANAGEMENT OF LAND SET AS NATIONAL GOAL

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 24 Mar 82 pp 1, 4

[Editorial: " Management and Use of Land To Be Highly Effective"]

[Text] Land for crop growing is an irreplaceable means of production and the result of thousands of years of our people's struggle and industrious labor. It is also the basis for distribution and construction of sectors of the national economy, residential areas and works that serve life, as well as for development of culture and consolidation of national defense.

Our people's precious "an inch of land is an inch of gold" tradition is further developed to bring about great achievements in many aspects in the light of the party line and under conditions of the new production relationships.

The result of exploiting land for crop growing is evaluated mainly on two counts: exploitation in breadth and in depth.

Following each victorious war of resistance against the French colonialists, the American imperialists and the Beijing expansionists, hundreds of thousands of hectares of land which had been destroyed by the aggressors or left idle were quickly restored for production. The movement of people to new economic zones and the redistribution of population have opened hundreds of thousands of hectares of new land. The large areas of uncultivated and fallow land in Dong Thap Muoi, on the coast of the Mekong delta and the central highlands are being gradually put to use through different measures now being taken.

In-depth exploitation by means of intensive cultivation and multicropping brings about results in many aspects, particularly the ability to increase crop yields, land productivity and volume of products per unit area. The movement for reorganization of production, combined with rearrangement of the production pattern and crop allocation, brings about new changes on the agricultural front. Creative ways of growing crops applicable to different types of ricefields and land allow the opening of new production seasons, force the fields to take new crops more quickly and clearly increase the cultivated areas. The technical progresses that

have been applied to production, particularly the use of high-yielding short-term rice varieties to replace the low-yielding long-term ones, have doubled and tripled the crop yields and volume of rice production.

However, the exploitation of land, both in breadth and in depth, still faces many weak aspects and shortcomings. More common is the phenomenon of loose management leading to seizure of land for illegal use and unsystematic use causing damage to the soil.

Many pieces of land within the planned cultivated areas of many state-operated production installations, including state farms and state forests, were left idle. Many areas that had been plowed but then left uncultivated lost their rich soil and again became idle and fallow. While we had to overcome many difficulties and to expend labor and money in order to open a piece of new land, in many localities the cultivated areas (mostly land for rice growing) were reduced because of many reasons. In addition to the land that was legally used for nonagricultural purposes, there were quite a few cases of illegal seizure of land or action that violated policy rules, such as illegal granting of land, seizure of public land for digging ponds, building houses, turning into gardens, etc. In 14 years (1964-1978), the Red River delta and midlands lost 106,000 hectares of rice-growing land, equal to the total rice-growing area of Binh Tri Thien Province.

The in-depth exploitation of land by means of intensive cultivation and multicropping also has the tendency to slow down; the use of fertilizers at a low level, improper for the high-yielding rice varieties that require lots of nutrients, has depleted the rich soil. Many crops are grown without fertilizer, or with negligible amounts of fertilizer, mostly in the case of subsidiary food crops and industrial plants. Many rice varieties and other grain crops, including the ones planted as main crops, have shown signs of decline. Land is not protected, with the soil being pozzolized and depleted; even in areas of red basalt soil there has been the phenomenon of gley and rock forming.

Land which belongs to all people is the precious asset of society as a whole; everybody is responsible for conserving, protecting and systematically using it so as to extend its area and to make it better everyday. This important task is being formally regulated by means of policies, regulations and laws. The state has issued regulations dealing with the first important things to be done as a basis for land management and use, such as unified and strengthened land management by the state; land survey, classification and registration of land throughout the country; organization of the land management sector from central to basic level. These regulations must be implemented promptly within the set deadline in order to begin including land exploitation in our plans.

Intensive cultivation measures must be taken simultaneously, with efforts being concentrated upon the basic technical measures: to get to know through investigation

the quality of land and to increase our abilities to fight flood, drought, acidity, alkalinity and salinity and to be self-sufficient in watering and drainage; to strengthen production of organic fertilizers and to rationally use inorganic fertilizers; to have enough good seeds and to effectively fight diseases. At the same time, to improve the system of management, to avoid the all-level methods, to build accounting as a base for business activities and to widely apply the system of signing end-product contracts with laborers.

To achieve highly effective land management and use is a great and long-term revolutionary movement on a national scale. Every person, every sector and every echelon, depending on one's position, must assert and emphasize the sense of responsibility, correctly carry out the state regulations and help to extend the cultivated areas according to plans and to increase soil fertility.

5598

CSO: 4209/299

AGRICULTURE

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCT CONTRACTING BROADENED IN TIEN GIANG, LONG AN

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 13 Mar 82 p 1

[Text] VNA—Since mid-1980, Tien Giang has directed its districts and city to concentrate on strengthening cooperatives and production collectives and raising their qualities. The province and districts have quickly drawn experiences and corrected shortcomings in order to put the [agricultural] transformation task into the right track. With the setting up of 32 more production collectives in 1981, the total number of collectives and cooperatives in the province rose to 92. The province also set up 3,900 production solidarity units and a number of new-rice varieties production teams.

However, the agricultural transformation movement in Tien Giang was not yet strong and even in the past year. The task of motivating the masses was carried out unsatisfactorily. Production collectives were nonexistent in a good many villages. Management tended to decline in many collectives and cooperatives. Some 50 percent of the total number of collectives in the province were considered weak and inferior.

In 1982, the province has tried to overcome shortcomings, to make party members, cadres and the masses thoroughly understand the agricultural transformation line and policy, to concentrate efforts on consolidating collectives and vigorously developing production solidarity units and, on this basis, to build new production collectives according to the "positiveness, stability" motto and to rapidly broaden the product contract system among all new and old collectives.

The province is providing training and advanced training for managerial cadres to meet the requirements of agricultural transformation and is strengthening other tasks such as the building of the party, administration and mass organizations to further promote this transformation.

In the 1981-1982 winter-spring season, Long An has implemented the product contract system in collective No 9 in Loi Binh Nhon Village (Ben Thu) and has obtained a fairly good result and valuable experiences. In the summer-fall season this year, the province will extend this new form of contracting to all collectives and cooperatives. Also in the same season, more than 200 collectives will become fully qualified to apply the product contract system.

The province has disseminated the product contract experiences of collective No 9 among hundreds of grassroots cadres and has assigned many capable cadres to help production installations implement the new contract system. The Cooperativization School has trained 1,500 collective management cadres of whom 200 have undergone advanced training in product contracting.

Nearly 100 collectives in Ben Thu, Vam Co, Can Duoc and Can Giuoc Districts have completed the drawing of plans to implement the product contract system. Many collectives in Vinh Hung and Moc Hoa Districts have prepared the soil and rice varieties and created conditions for laborers to achieve and surpass the contract output.

Many collectives have visited collective No 9 to study its experiences in guiding the implementation of the product contract system. This collective has just finished harvesting the first rice crop ever grown under the product contract system and has achieved an average per hectare output of 40 quintals representing a 10-quintal increase over the past.

9332

CSO: 4209/287

AGRICULTURE

FORESTRY MINISTER DISCUSSES FARMING-FORESTRY COORDINATION

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 10 Mar 82 p 3

[Article by Phan Xuan Dot, Minister of Forestry and Chairman of Research Program on Combined Agro-Forestry Science: "Coordination of Farming and Forestry, a Highly Effective Production Formula"]

[Text] Coordinating farming and forestry is a progressive production formula based on the use of the aggregate potentials of land, climate, living beings and on-the-spot labor in each region.

In our country, the implementation of the task of coordinating farming and forestry is not only urgently required by the need for grain, food and forest and special products but is also a requirement stemming from the necessity of protecting the environment, transforming land, increasing its fertility and safeguarding production by agriculture and many other sectors. In the economic field, the coordination of farming and forestry brings about great effects whenever and in whatever area it is carried out. It is precisely for this reason that coordinating farming and forestry has become a major party-state policy for many years. Many localities, state farms and forests and agro-forestry production cooperatives have responded to this policy, obtained initial concrete results, drawn valuable experiences from the coordination of farming and forestry and formed good models in carrying out this task.

Most outstanding is the result of the people's movement to grow trees in response to Uncle Ho's appeal in the past more than 20 years in the Red River delta, Region 4, (former) Region 5 and the Mekong River delta. Fully using land by growing trees on the borders of each region and on the sides of canals has had the effect of breaking the force of winds for the benefit of intensive cultivation in agriculture and has also yielded a noticeable volume of timber, firewood and forest products to meet the on-the-spot needs of the people. According to still incomplete statistics, over the past years the various localities have grown more than 2 billion trees of different kinds and reaped 5.7 million cubic meters of timber, 8.5 million stores of firewood and many other sorts of forest products. As one of the best tree-growing units in the country, Ly Nhan District has satisfactorily grown trees by applying this combination formula. Though the average per capita rate is less than 1,000 square meters of land of

which only 750 are arable, there are now 1,035 timber, fruit and windbreak trees per hectare as a result of the tree planting activities in the past 20 years. An increase has been obtained in the productivity and volume of production of the rice, subsidiary food and industrial crops which not only constitute a factor in intensive cultivation but have also had a protective effect. Each year, Ly Nhan District reaps over 25,000 cubic meters of timber and 12,000 steres of firewood equivalent to the yearly timber yield of a mountainous district which abounds in forests.

In the sandy coastal areas of Central Vietnam, creative working methods have been devised by the people of many localities such as the villages of Trieu Van (Trieu Hai, Binh Tri Thien) and Binh Duong (Thang Binh, Quang Nam-Da Nang) where experiences have been drawn from a very original method of coordinagint farming and forestry in a sandy region. By planting trees with the combined purpose of breaking the force of wind and sand blowing, the Trieu Van villagers have been able to transform an infertile sandy soil into a fertile one suitable for rice and potato cultivation. Over a period of 5 years (1975-1980), the farming area has been extended from 70 to 319 hectares and self-sufficiency achieved in the production of grain and firewood for local consumption. By applying the same working method, Binh Duong Village—one of the localities seriously affected by the war aftermath—has, 5 years after the liberation day, covered a sandy region with greenery made of 9 million sea pines planted on ricefields and fertile land, transformed a harsh natural environment, simultaneously created an abundant source of forest products and derived a yearly income from the planted trees amounting to three-fourths of the gross income of its cooperatives.

On the saline coastal flood land and in the acid and alkaline areas of the Nam Bo delta, the planting of forests of *lycopersicum esculentum* [dquowcs], cypress, mangroves, cajuputs, "so dquax", etc., has had a great effect on fixing the soil, extending the coastline toward the sea, reforming the degree of acidity and salinity, gradually restoring soil fertility and coordinately promoting agricultural production, animal husbandry, water conservancy, maritime products exploitation and apiculture...

For many centuries, the destruction of vegetation has degraded the soil of the vast bare-hill areas in teh midlands; coordinating farming and forestry is the only measure capable of restoring productivity to this soil. In these areas, a number of state forests and cooperatives have won success and served as noteworthy models. The Huong Khe state forest (Nghe Tinh), Dong Trieu state farm (Quang Ninh), Dao Xa cooperative (Vinh Phu), Can Kiem cooperative (Hanoi) and many others have found out formulas to grow crops to cover the soil with greenery and transform it and have coordinated this task with the growing of fruit trees and plants yielding special products for animal husbandry and with the production of farinaceous and food plants, thus offering new prospects of applying the method of covering millions of bare-hill land with greenery in a relatively short period of time, especially by growing leguminous plants.

On the forest soil, many state forests which combine forestry with industry and many agro-forestry cooperatives in the provinces of Hoang Lien Son, Ha Tuyen, Quang Ninh, Nghe Tinh, Quang Nam-Da Nang, Nghia Binh, Song Ha, Gia Lai-Kon Tum and Dac Lac have, for many years, fully used land to grow forests and to simultaneously produce rice, corn, cassava, beans, medicinal plants as well as crops yielding special products. This really versatile formula for coordinated production consists in trying to grow agricultural crops and to interplant them with forest trees during two or three consecutive seasons until the land is completely covered by forest trees. By applying this method, state forests have been able to produce 20,000 to 30,000 more tons of grain each year, to partially achieve self-sufficiency to a notable extent and to reduce the amount of grain to be supplied by the state. Though forest trees have grown rapidly, the afforestation costs have been reduced because less efforts have been required to tend them and to carry out weeding. In the past, many cooperatives specialized in forestry usually had trouble securing enough grain for their subsistence but ever since they applied the combined agro-forestry production formula, they have scored achievements in afforestation and have simultaneously obtained more grain to solve this problem by themselves and also to make a contribution to the state. Shifting from a production method based on nomadic farming involving the burning down of forests to turn them into slash-burn upland fields, the Vien Son cooperative (Hoang Lien Son) has applied the agro-forestry combination formula and has thus been able to fully use all the available lands to grow rice and subsidiary feed crops, to simultaneously mix them with the cinnamon trees planted on the forest land, to obtain enough grain for itself, to maintain the forests and to cultivate hundreds of hectares more of cinnamon for export. Realities have clearly shown that combined agro-forestry production is not only a common demand by the economy as a whole but also an objective requirement of forestry itself. Generally speaking, the land and the potentials inherent in the vegetation, living things and climate are favorable to the simultaneous development of forestry production in all its aspects and also of crop cultivation, animal husbandry, pisciculture and other business activities. Rich experiences in applying this overall, coordinated production method have been drawn by the Ngoi Lao and Huong Son state forests (Hoang Lien Son and Nghe Tinh respectively). By fully using all available lands, the Huong Son state forest has each year produced a further 120 tons of rice and corn, 100 tons of peanuts, 300 tons of cassava, 2,000 hogs and 1,000 cattle, helped stabilize and improve the workers' life and brilliantly fulfilled the task of exploiting products and delivering them to the state. Beside interplanting upland rice on hundreds of hectares of forest land, the Ngoi Lao state forest has organized the raising of cattle herds in areas below the forests and the breeding of hundreds of thousands of fish in lakes, ponds and where there is water and has thus reaped an additional volume of products for its own subsistence while doing a profitable business.

Along with the result of production, the task of reviewing experiences and carrying out experiments and scientific research into the coordination of farming and forestry has registered initial achievements. Especially since

1978 to date, under the leadership of the Standing Committee of the Council of Ministers, the Ministry of Forestry--which is in charge of presiding over the agro-forestry coordination program, coordinating with the sectors concerned and accelerating the manifold programmed activities on a national scale--has recapitulated many valuable experiences among the people, spread their application and simultaneously organized research and the experimental building of new models in Cau Hai (Vinh Phu), Hau Lung (Lang Son), Hoa Thuong (Bac Thai), Ea Bong (Dac Lac), Pleiku, Minh Phu (Vinh Phu), Ham Yen, Bac Quang (Ha Tuyen), Lam Dong, and Tan Tao (Ho Chi Minh City) with varied and substantial research themes aimed at gradually perfecting and heightening the scientific character and effectiveness of a production technique system based on the agro-forestry combination formula.

However, in the production field and with regard to the technical progresses applied, the task of exercising organization and guidance and formulating specific policies is still suffering from limitations which we and the sectors concerned are strenuously investigating and trying to solve. Right now, it is necessary to step up zoning and to determine categories of land suitable for agro-forestry combination following the example of appropriate models. Special attention must be paid to helping and guiding the execution of rational agro-forestry production projects on a district scale and in state farms and forests, cooperatives, public agencies and army units with the objective of developing the capacities of natural resources, protecting the forest assets and further increasing the possibility of producing grain, food, special products and pharmaceuticals... It is necessary to gradually carry out the planning of agro-forestry production by production installations through the introduction of technical progress made by models into specific regions and along with a suitable managerial mechanism and appropriate policies including those which govern purchase prices and payment for combined agro-forest products and which encourage the full use of land by interplanting forest trees and crops which yield grain, food and special export products.

From the scientific-technical point of view, the cultivation of composite living things according to the agro-forestry combination formula is obviously a very new and complex undertaking. In the near future, we will step up all the activities involved in the agro-forestry combination program, submit many new topics and assess the result obtained from research in order to gradually apply it in production, to rapidly and broadly implement this formula in all areas, to contribute to substantially increasing the volume of grain, food and other products useful to society, to accelerate the covering of bare hills and unused lands with greenery, to restore fertility to the soil and also rehabilitate and conserve the tropical ecological environment in our country.

9332

CSO: 4209/279

AGRICULTURE

FERTILIZER SHORTAGE HAMPERS RICE PRODUCTION

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 21 Mar 62 p 1

[Article: "The Northern Provinces Concentrate on Cultivating Their Winter-Spring Rice; Rice Crops of the Southern Provinces Growing Well"]

[Text] The entire country has sown or transplanted 1.58 million hectares of winter-spring rice, 95.2 percent of the plan quota and roughly the same amount as had been sown or transplanted by this time last year, a year in which the rice crops were sown and transplanted at a rapid rate.

The northern provinces have sown or transplanted 97 percent of their plan quota, an increase of more than 6,500 hectares compared to the same period of time last year. The southern provinces have sown or transplanted 92 percent of their plan quota.

The season for sowing and transplanting winter-spring rice has ended in both the North and the South. Scattered places in a number of localities in the North are continuing to transplant rice in seedling fields. The northern provinces still have about 10,000 hectares that have not been sown or transplanted, primarily in the mountain provinces, where farmers have the habit of transplanting spring rice late. The southern provinces still have about 40,000 hectares that have not been sown or transplanted as a result of harvesting 10th month rice late and not promptly providing land for spring rice.

One new aspect in the northern provinces has been that the cultivation, weeding and fertilization of rice have been carried out more rapidly than in previous years. More 312,000 hectares of rice have been weeded for the first time, nearly 50,000 hectares more than during the same period of time in 1951 and a 2.2-fold increase compared to the same period in 1950. Some 50 percent of the land sown and transplanted with rice has been weeded for the first time and 40 percent has been weeded for the second time. In Binh Dinh Province, 60 percent of the land under cultivation of rice has been weeded twice and the third weeding has begun on 10,000 hectares. Compared to the requirements of intensive cultivation, there is a serious shortage of fertilizer. However, the quality of fertilizer and the techniques of applying it have been increased compared to previous seasons.

especially peaked, the winter-spring rice is sown well. There are some plantings of early winter-spring rice that were started poorly due to a short period of cold. The amount of area affected by rice pests is large, nearly the same as 1951. Partial drought has occurred on a limited scale. The difficulties are now waterweeds and pumps to assist drainage.

In the North, the winter-spring rice is sown well. The amount of area affected by insects is intermediate. In 1951 the rice pests continue to spread.

Together with cultivation and transplanting of winter-spring rice, the southern provinces have harvested 40 percent of early rice, 15 percent of the rice under cultivation. 1951 has harvested 50 percent of the area sown or transplanted, 1952 has harvested 45 percent. According to initial evaluations, the yield of spring rice has been relatively high in the fields that have been harvested.

In the coming days, when most of the rice is harvested, the following number of primary jobs will:

In the North, all available riverways, drainage and all other fertilizer must be utilized and applied to rice that has been sown and applied to stimulate the heading of winter-spring rice and early spring rice. It is necessary to routinely inspect fields, fully prepare crops, sprayers, spray tanks and insecticide and take the initiative in preventing and controlling insects and controlling pests. The operation, auxiliary food crops and industrial crops that have been planted must be cultivated and the mulch must be prepared for planting summer vegetables and auxiliary food crops.

The southern provinces must utilize the winter-spring rice harvest and promptly waterflood the various fields of rice. They must quickly harvest the main winter-spring rice plantings that have matured. They must inspect and fully prepare the material-technical conditions for the winter-spring season and 10th season season. Attention must be given to properly utilizing the planting of summer vegetables, auxiliary food crops and industrial crops.

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Date: 1952/3/7

HEAVY INDUSTRY AND CONSTRUCTION

BRIDGES RESTORED, COMPLETED IN SOUTH

HINH NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 22 Mar 82 p 1

[Article: "Gau Lau Bridge on the Thu Bon River Restored"]

[Text] Highway Section Number 5 recently completed the restoration of the Gau Lau Bridge. The Gau Lau Bridge, which is a major bridge in central Vietnam and is 345 meters long, lies along Route 1A and crosses the Thu Bon River in Quang Nam-Da Nang Province. Prior to the 1975 general offensive, two piers and four 130 meter spans of the bridge were destroyed. Over the past several years, the bridge has only received temporary repairs. Traffic across the bridge has been very slow and has not been safe.

Emulating to record achievements in celebration of the 5th Congress of the Party, Construction Site Number 20 and Number 21 of Bridge Corporation Number 302 and the Materials and Equipment Plant of Highway Section Number 5, with the assistance of the Rear Service General Department, worked urgently for 90 consecutive days and nights to repair the damaged piers and spans and pave the entire bridge with asphalt. The bridge was open to traffic during the repair work and detour roads did not have to be constructed.

Finally, on 13 March, the Gau Lau Bridge was fully restored.

In early October 1981, launching an emulation drive to record achievements in celebration of the party congress, Group 872 of the Truong Son Military Corps set for itself the target of completing the four bridges along the Truong Son Road in Quang Nam-Da Nang.

By late 1981, the two bridges at kilometers 332 and 335 had been completed. By the end of March, 1982, the remaining two bridges, the Hoa Khe Bridge and the Lam Khe Bridge, had been completed. In addition, the group also constructed 37 retaining walls, embankments and repaired many road sections that had been damaged by flooding.

Head of Bridge Corporation Number 24 Highway Section Number 6 (the Ministry of Communications and Transportation) has undertaken the construction of five large bridges in the central provinces and the Nam Bo Delta, the value of which is four times greater than the value of the construction and assembly work performed by the Corporation in 1980.

In recent practical achievement in celebration of the 5th Congress of the Party, the cadres and manual workers of the various construction units are focusing their efforts on completing many project items well and at low costs in an effort to complete three bridges, the Muong Dien and Cai Be Bridges in Dong Thap Province and the Cau Ke Bridge in Thuan Hai Province, by 19 May and the Minh Hai Bridge by National Day, 2 September.

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CSO: 4209/298

HEAVY INDUSTRY AND CONSTRUCTION

HOANG THACH CEMENT FACTORY NEARLY COMPLETED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 14 Mar 82 pp 1, 4

[Text] The Hoang Thach Cement Factory is a project designed to produce cement according to the dry method with a rated capacity of 1.1 million tons a year. The factory has been built in an area offering many convenient conditions: It is situated beside Hai Hung Province's ricefields, about 5 kms away from the Mao Khe coal mine and alongside the Da Bac River—the latter being connected to many large rivers in the Bac Bo region which are very convenient for water transportation. The main source of raw materials for cement production is constituted by limestone and clay which are found in great abundance in the Han mountain range close by the factory; a conveyor belt is the only equipment used to carry these raw materials directly into a grinder.

After more than 4 years of construction, Haiphong Building Corporation No 2, Bridge No 2 Building Corporation and Machines Installation Enterprise No 69 have basically completed the construction and installation of nearly 40 engineering items including a 85-meter high chimney, a 89-meter long limekiln with a diameter of more than 5 meters, a 348-meter long, 45-meter wide and 21-meter high warehouse and a 388-meter long 10-span bridge crossing the Da Bac River and linking the center of the main production area to the finished-product storehouse area composed of 5 silos with a capacity of nearly 20,000 tons.

The factory is in the process of perfection and is being prepared to start production by the end of this year. The installation of an electric power station has been completed and adjustments are being made continuously. The construction of the remaining engineering items on the side of Vinh Tuy is being stepped up. The federation of cement factories is coordinating with the factory to make production preparations. The limestone mining section has produced more than 200,000 cubic meters. The transport unit has carried nearly 10,000 tons of coal to the factory. Technical workers who operate the limekiln, grinder and power station are undergoing training to further raise their professional standard. A contingent of economic and technical management cadres has been formed and is being strengthened to systematically carry out industrial management once the factory starts production.

9332

CSO: 4209/287

HEAVY INDUSTRY AND CONSTRUCTION

PROGRESS ON DIESEL ENGINE FACTORY REPORTED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 21 Mar 82 p 1

[Article: "The Song Cong Diesel Engine Factory"]

[Text:] The Song Cong Diesel Engine Factory is being constructed in Bac Thai Province more than 60 kilometers northwest of Hanoi. This is the largest engine manufacturing installation in our country at this time and is being constructed with the assistance of the Soviet Union. Upon completion, the factory will annually produce thousands of 50 horsepower diesel engines and various types of spare parts, cast blanks, forged blanks and stamped blanks for internal combustion engines and so forth. The factory consists of 44 large and small project items, including many shops that measure 60,000 square meters. The special purpose railroad system linking the factory to the Luong Son Railroad Station is nearly 7 kilometers long. The water pump system has a capacity of 30,000 cubic meters per day.

Construction began in March, 1977. Construction and Assembly Corporation Number 2, which has overcome many difficulties with equipment, has excavated and leveled more than one-half million cubic meters of dirt, poured 40,000 cubic meters of concrete, assembled more than 4,500 tons of steel members, laid 5,600 cubic meters of brick and roofing tiles covering more than 116,000 square meters and installed more than 80 kilometers of electric cable. Nearly 6,000 tons of industrial equipment of various types have been installed. Many sections have been immediately put into use upon completion of their construction. Seven sections of the factory are producing internal combustion spare parts and manufacturing a number of pieces of non-standard equipment to support the construction of the factory.

7504

130: 4209/297

LIGHT INDUSTRY

PAPER FACTORY BUILT IN VINH PHU

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 13 Mar 82 p 1

[Text] The Vinh Phu Paper Combine has been built at the foot of Mt. Voi, about 10 kms from the Hung temple. An outstanding feature of this project is the close connection between a modern paper-producing industrial installation and a region where raw materials [producing trees] are grown and exploited according to zoning and planning and through a network of integrated and closed works starting from the growing of raw materials producing plants to the manufacture of the end product—paper and notebooks. With an area of more than 50,000 hectares, the raw materials producing region is cultivated with various kinds of trees such as "mo," ficus religiosa [boof dqeff] and "three-leaf" pines [thoong ba las] which are planted on hills stretching from Phy Tho, Bac Quang and Ham Yen to Tuyen Quang.

The factory area is composed of a homogeneous network of enterprises—electricity, water, grinding, pulping, mechanical engineering, etc.—all in all, 10 principal works and over 20 auxiliary ones. On completion of construction, the factory will produce each year more than 50,000 tons of paper of various kinds composed mostly of writing and printing paper and including high-quality paper and wrapping paper. Thanks to Swedish aid, after 4 years of construction, pulping machine No 1 on 29 November 1980 officially started manufacturing a product bearing the "Vinh Phy Paper" trademark. Production ranged from 70 to over 100 tons on many days—102 and up to 108 tons on some days in February.

During an emulation drive to score achievements to greet the Fifth Party Congress, Machines Installation Enterprise No 3 and the Level Field Building Work Site in close cooperation with foreign specialists stepped up the construction and installation of pulping machine No 2 and the remaining engineering items such as the chemical shop, grinding shop, processing section and Lo River port. Completed a month ahead of schedule, on 28 February 1982, pulping machine No 2 had a test run and produced the first roll of white paper. The Vinh Phu Paper Combine has thus basically completed the installation of its industrial equipment and put two entire pulping machines into operation. While trying to satisfactorily perfecting the building and installation of the remaining engineering items, the factory will exert every effort to produce 1,500 tons of paper in March.

9332

CSO: 4209/287

LABOR

TRAINING, PLACEMENT SUGGESTED FOR UNSKILLED YOUTHS

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 26 Mar 82 p 2

[Article by Le Manh Khoa, Institute of Labor Science, Ministry of Labor: "Finding Work for Unskilled Youths"]

[Text] Every year our country has more than 1 million youths reaching labor age. Most of them enter production without going through state vocational schools. Therefore, special importance must be attached to job placement for these youths.

Generally speaking, the new grownups are in no position to find out exactly everything about occupations, nor do they have a sufficient knowledge of their working capacity and wishes. To assist youths in choosing occupations that suit their capabilities and wishes while satisfying the needs for development of the national economy, we must teach general-school pupils in general technology and bring career guidance into schools (general, vocational and trade schools), as well as into job placement organs, including the ones of the army and labor-using organs and enterprises.

To draw large numbers of youths into productive labor and to avoid switching of occupations later, we must develop forms of placement suitable for their wishes about jobs.

Among the youths who leave general schools, many are ready to do any work while waiting to take entrance examinations to be admitted to colleges or vocational schools, or to find jobs that they want. We must therefore develop forms of placement such as fixed-time labor contracts (lasting for 1-5 years), economy-building assault youth units (a form of fixed-time labor contracts requiring enthusiastic youths to voluntarily go to work in hardship and remote locations -- this form is necessary for the Youth Union to combine its movement and education) and obligation corvee labor units (fulfilling corvee obligation in the place of people fulfilling regulated labor obligation and getting paid similarly to those under labor contracts). The funds that cover this kind of labor consist of the share given by the state for corvee labor and also contributions from the people who have to fulfill corvee obligation but cannot because of physical conditions. One of the guidelines

for perfecting the above-mentioned forms of placement is as follows: in addition to material encouragement measures, attention must be paid to the wishes of those youths who want to have a steady job suitable for their personal choice or to continue their cultural studies or vocational training, with placement and examination priorities to be granted to those youths who have brilliantly fulfilled their labor task, mostly members of assault youth units.

A new direction aimed at providing unskilled youths with jobs while satisfying the needs for development of the local economy is to widely develop small industry and handicrafts, as well as services in the collective sector, and to provide vocational training in each locality, as many localities (Hanoi, Haiphong, Ho Chi Minh City, Ha Nam Ninh Province, etc.) have done. Vocational training in localities consists of work and study, and joint undertaking by the state or production installations and the people (the state or production installations assist in providing the means of learning and part of the costs and the rest is to be covered by contributions from the people). As to the form of private vocational training, individuals pay tuition by themselves. To recruit unskilled youths, to give them a quick training and to send them abroad to work, or to send them abroad for a combination of training and cooperative use of labor, is another direction aimed at finding jobs for unskilled youths that now needs guidance so as to exactly fulfill the need and to avoid any negative aspects.

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CSO: 4209/299

LABOR

NGHE TINH SENDS PEOPLE TO NEW ECONOMIC ZONES IN DAC LAC

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 24 Mar 82 p 1

[Article: "Nghe Tinh: More Than 6,000 People Go to New Economic Zones"]

[Text] By 3 March Nghe Tinh Province has sent 1,495 families totaling 6,618 people, including 3,525 laborers, to the new economic zones within the state and army farms in Dac Lac Province (not including 100 families being sent to Song Be, Dong Nai and Tien Giang Provinces). The new economic zone committee issued them official documents and took care of procedural work while the families were to take care of themselves.

Nghe Tinh attaches importance to maintaining a balance among occupations to include carpenters, masons, mechanics, vehicle operators, veterinary workers, teachers, nurses, physicians, etc.

Among those who left there were 104 party members, 356 Youth Union members and 1 party committee secretary, thus ensuring the local administration and mass organizations that there would be leadership for the newcomers to quickly stabilize their living conditions and to start production work within the crop season.

5598

CSO: 4209/299

POPULATION, CUSTOMS AND CULTURE

EDITORIAL SETS GUIDELINES FOR WORK AMONG MINORITIES

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 20 Mar 62 pp 1, 4

[Editorial: "Work in the Ethnic Minority Areas"]

[Text] Our nation of Vietnam, which consists of ethnic Vietnamese and more than 50 ethnic minorities, is a great family of fraternal nationalities that have long shared a common history and a common destiny. The community of nationalities in Vietnam has fought and sacrificed together over many centuries to build and defend the fatherland.

With their population of 1.3 million, the ethnic minorities constitute 11 percent of the country's population, and live primarily in the large strategic areas of the country. All of the ethnic minorities have a tradition of ardent patriotism, of uniting with and helping one another in struggle and labor. Under the old, feudal colonial system, the compatriots of the ethnic minorities were oppressed and exploited the most. Therefore, they participated in all patriotic campaigns and the revolution, struggling for liberation. Under the leadership of our party, many uprisings occurred and many mountain areas became bases of the revolution; all ethnic minorities made worthy contributions to the glorious victories of the August Revolution, of the two wars of resistance against the French and American imperialists. Together with these brilliant victories and the victories of many other democratic and socialist campaigns, the ethnic minorities established their right of collective mastery of the country and society. Equality among the ethnic minorities was established.

The constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam states: "The state protects, strengthens and consolidates the broad unity of nationalities, prohibits every act that reflects disdain for or is an attempt to divide the nationalities" and "adopts a plan for gradually eliminating the differences among the ethnic minorities with regard to their level of economic and cultural development." The ethnic minorities have the right to use their own spoken and written languages, to maintain and develop their fine customs, habits, traditions and cultures.

These are very important revolutionary accomplishments of the Vietnamese revolution.

After the country was reunified and began advancing to socialism, the fraternal ethnic minorities have again displayed their tradition of unity, bravely overcome

difficulties and challenges and won many new victories. With the strength of the unity among the various nationalities, our army and people rapidly defeated the two wars of aggression rilled with crimes launched by the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists and quickly restored production and stabilized their lives. Political security has been maintained. The national defense system has been strengthened. On the economic front, the compatriots of the ethnic minorities in the highlands have gradually assumed settled lifestyles. In the Central Highlands and many other areas, production collectives and agricultural cooperatives have been established. Millions of lowland compatriots have voluntarily left their native villages to go to areas in the midlands and mountains to work with the compatriots of the ethnic minorities to build the economy and develop the culture. Many state farms, forestry sites, new economic zones, technical stations and farms, industrial enterprises and roads have been constructed. Illiteracy has gradually been eliminated. Cultural, public health and educational facilities are gradually being expanded. More and more members of the ethnic minorities are joining the ranks of the working class and socialist intellectuals. The organizations of the party, the government and the mass organizations have been strengthened in all areas to varying degrees. The number of leadership cadres, management cadres and military cadres who are members of the ethnic minorities has been constantly increasing.

The level of economic development and the standard of living of the ethnic minorities in many areas are still low. Many places are encountering numerous difficulties, especially in the highland areas and in areas along the borders. More positive assistance is needed to stabilize living conditions, develop production and maintain combat readiness. The destruction of the forests is still serious and can only be stopped by means of intensifying the settlement of nomads.

Fully implementing the nationalities policies and constantly strengthening the unity of the ethnic minorities are political prerequisites of utmost importance to building and defending the fatherland, to defeating the scheme of the enemy to divide the ethnic minorities. The guidance provided in the ethnic minority areas must delve deeply into each area in order to firmly grasp the situation and promptly resolve specific, practical problems. The ethnic minority areas have abundant economic potentials. To develop these potentials, it is necessary to tap the initiative and creativity of the localities and basic unity, correctly implement economic and social policies and expand the exchanges among localities.

Cadre training is always work of decisive importance. The party organizations and governments on the various levels have the obligation of routinely concerning themselves with cadre work among the ethnic minorities.

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POPULATION CUSTOMS, AND CULTURE

BRIEFS

PEOPLE MOVED--From 1 January to 10 March 1982, the entire country moved 28,431 people including 15,610 laborers to build new economic zones. The Provinces of Ha Nam Ninh, Binh Tri Thien, Quang Nam-Da Nang, Nghia Binh and Thai Binh fulfilled 50 percent of the plan norm. In particular, Ha Nam, Ninh and Binh Tri Thien overcame numerous difficulties and continued to satisfactorily motivate people voluntarily to go to build new economic zones. The above-mentioned people have been distributed among state farms and collective production sectors or mixed with the people in the existing production installations. Generally speaking, the transfer of population and laborers in the first quarter has been slow, however. March and early April are the most convenient time to move people. Provinces and cities must lose no time in continuing satisfactorily to carry out the task of motivating the people and organizing their transfer and must ensure that the state plan norms are fulfilled at all costs. [Text] [Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 14 Mar 82 p 1] 9332

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